and the 7th Euroframe conference 'After the crisis: exit strategies for EU economies in a globalised world ', Amsterdam, June 11, 2010 This paper addresses the sustainability of government debt in Europe and is motivated by the recent debt increases following the crisis. We evaluate the sustainability in a time frame of ten years in which governments will be able to implement budget rules to get budget deficits under control. We develop a fiscal sustainability model for selected EMU member states that uses stochastic inputs based on historic data, closely following van Wijnbergen's (van Wijnbergen and Budina, 2008) approach. We simulate the development of government debt as a percentage of GDP and show its expectation value including a confidence interval for a member state conditional on deficit reduction scenarios and the behaviour of other EMU member states.
Introduction
Government debts have surged in Europe and other western countries in response to the worldwide financial crisis which forced several EU member states to support financial institutions and to stimulate the economy while tax revenues dwindled. On average debt Bunds. Also credit default swap ("CDS") spreads (number of basis points an owner pays for insurance against the default risk of the bond) are volatile to more or less the same extent. For some time the recent rise in government budget deficits and debts worried mainly academics, policy makers and politicians. In the beginning of 2010 the financial markets questioned the solvability of some member states, leading again rising to sovereign bonds spreads and finally to urgent and drastic actions of the EU and IMF to support Greece and other threatened member states.
These developments lead to several questions. First, are government debts in Europe indeed unsustainable and -if they are − for which countries is this case? Second, why do developments in one member states affect the situation in other countries? The issue of medium term sustainability is dependent on the notion of what a sustainable level of government debt is and on the necessary EU framework and national policies that will be crafted and implemented to attain such sustainable levels.
To answer these questions we first survey the literature on sustainable government debt and on cross-border spillovers of government debt. This literature consists of a theoretical and empirical part. The theoretical literature provides insights in the determinants of government debt and spillovers. We use the empirical literature to judge the relevance of these determinants.
With respect to sustainability various measures are developed to address this issue. Moreover, many countries have experienced government debt defaults. From these experiences some common determinants threatening sustainability can be derived. These issues are extensively discussed in section 2. The empirical literature on spillovers of government debt indicates the relevance of some of the spillover channels. Section 3 provides an overview.
Second, we develop a sustainable debt model based on van Wijnbergen and Budina (van Wijnbergen and Budina, 2008) . This model allows us to assess the expected development and confidence interval of government debts using stochastic simulations based on historic inputs.
We make use of the standard relation that the government debt-to-gdp-ratio depends on last year's debt-ratio, the primary surplus (including seigniorage revenue), the real interest rate, real GDP growth and other exogenous factors affecting the budget, like the costs of ageing and of the bailout of banks. The model allows for impacts that are conditional on the inputs of other countries with respect to economic growth and the interest rate. The stochastic simulations provide some indications on the possible bandwidth of outcomes due to uncertainty. We apply 'stress-tests' along several scenarios. Combining the outcomes with the criteria derived form the literature allows us to assess the sustainability of sovereign debt in selected EMU countries.
From the literature review on sustainable debt levels we derive four indicators that appear to be useful for the assessment of sovereign debt sustainability. First, the forward looking sustainability gap indicator which shows the distance in terms of primary surplus as a percentage of GDP from a stable debt-ratio. Second, the backward looking sustainability gap indicator which indicates whether the current debt level is commensurate with the debt-ratio that would be sustainable if augmented primary surpluses, interest rates and GDP growth rates would remain at their average level of the recent past. Third, the debt-to-government revenue indicator that was on average 350% for emerging market economies that defaulted since 1998
and 250% for non-defaulting countries (Callen et al., 2003) . And finally the debt-to-GDP ratio for which a threshold value of 90% can be associated with below-median GDP-growth (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010) ; hence, it is likely that maintaining debt-ratio's around 90% or higher is more difficult and thus less sustainable than debt-ratio's at a more modest level.
From the literature survey on cross-border spillovers from sovereign debts we conclude that the magnitudes of most spillovers are small. There are no empirical indications that inflation expectations are modified nor that in the longer term economic performance in other countries is affected via the various channels of cross-border transactions. There may be modest effects on interest rates from high budget deficits and high government debts in other countries but their magnitude is small. However, once contagion occurs the spillovers can suddenly be large.
These financial spillovers are larger if cross-holding of government bonds is more significant.
With a weak and fragile banking system the contagion mechanism could disrupt economies across borders. This is the main argument for some coordination of fiscal policies.
Our assessments of sovereign debt developments depart from recent OECD projections. We apply an OECD baseline and consider two OECD variants that reflect a) extra consolidation of government budgets (raising primary surpluses) and b) the additional costs of ageing (reducing primary surpluses). Moreover, we apply two stress tests on the baseline projection. The first of these reflects higher than baseline interest rates. The second reflects a prolonged recession by maintaining the output gap. Using the four indicators for sustainability we conclude that a wide variety of scenarios is conceivable in which in a single case (baseline + consolidation) only a few of the member states considered are in a difficult sovereign debt position while in other cases (baseline + ageing; prolonged recession) most countries under consideration are potentially heading for unsustainable debts.
Thus, our assessment of the sustainability of sovereign debts within EMU and our mixed results over miscellaneous scenario assumptions provide an important background for judging current policy actions by the EU and Member States to raise primary surpluses. Are these actions sufficient to stabilize government debt and to reduce debt levels whenever reduction is needed? From this perspective we indicate that it is vitally important to strengthen the SGP and to put other mechanisms in place that can serve as guidelines for crisis management. EMU definitely should become prepared to prevent future sovereign debt crises.
Sustainable debt levels in the literature

No Ponzi-finance scheme
From the literature (e.g. Bohn, 2005 , Buiter, 2009 , van Wijnbergen and Budina, 2008 ) the basic requirement for the sustainability of public debt, is that governments should not engage in a
Ponzi-finance scheme. In such a scheme existing debt is serviced forever by issuing additional debt to cover both interest payments and principal repayments. Instead governments should stay within their intertemporal budget constraints. This implies that the discounted value of current and future income plus initial wealth should at least be equal to the discounted value of all current and future non-interest expenditure (van Wijnbergen and Budina, 2008) . Formally this comes down to: 
or: initial (net) debt should at most equal the discounted value of all future augmented primary surpluses. In the sequel we will often for simplicity call p i the primary surplus although it always has the wider meaning of primary surplus augmented with seigniorage.
To understand the implications of (2.2), it is useful to write down a simpler construct, the so called flow budget constraint: we see that initial debt equals the discounted sum of the primary surplus and end of period debt.
Substituting (2.4) repeatedly into itself, from t+1 onwards, yields Some authors (e.g. Kremers, 1989) Advantage of the no-Ponzi scheme criterion is that it translates the fact the debt has to be repaid eventually into a mathematical formula. Disadvantage however is that the criterion is very soft and not of immediate use: it states no more than that one has to pay eventually, which could be in the (very) distant future.
Sustainability gap indicators
Many authors have focused on indicators of how far fiscal policy departs from sustainability (e.g. Chalk and Hemming, 2000 If r γ > freezing the debt-to-gdp ratio will obviously leave the government within the intertemporal budget constraint because the growth rate of debt will be less than the rate of interest. If r γ < the government would have the opportunity to engage in a Ponzi scheme, maintaining the primary surplus at zero and issuing forever new debt to service existing debts while the debt ratio would decline over time. However, an excess of the growth rate over the interest rate implies that the economy is dynamically inefficient and saving and investing too much. Thus, a Ponzi scheme for government funding could then be seen as a corrective action to absorb excess savings of the private sector (Romer, 2006) . In an uncertain world the growth rate of gdp may temporarily exceed the rate of interest on government bonds. Bohn (1998) shows that under uncertainty an attempt to issue debt and roll it over forever without ever running a positive primary surplus has a positive probability. Conversely, if there is a positive probability that future interest rates will exceed the growth rate, a zero primary surplus is not sustainable.
If the government wants to prevent debt as a percentage of GDP to grow, a lower bound on the augmented primary surplus is implied
From (2.8) it follows immediately why it may be impossible to stabilize the debt ratio if a country is heading at a sovereign debt crisis. First, in such a situation γ is likely to be small or negative. Second, the interest rate on new roll-over debt may rise quite substantially. Thus, the (2.8) target for primary surplus may easily become infeasible, in particular -as within EMU − if simply expanding the money supply is not an option. Buiter (2009) A negative value for this indicator would then suggest that the current augmented primary surplus falls short of the target level that would stabilize the debt ratio and that fiscal policy is 'thus' unsustainable. Callen et al. (2003) propose the so-called 'overborrowing ratio' as an indicator of fiscal sustainability. This indicator expresses the current debt-to-gdp ratio as a fraction of the debt-togdp ratio that would emerge from past averages in primary surpluses, real interest rates and real gdp-growth rates. If the indicator exceeds 1 the current debt level is considered too high relatively to the debt-ratio that would be sustainable if the augmented primary surplus, interest rates and growth rates would remain at their average level of the recent past.
Note that we can also express the information of the overborrowing ratio in terms of a backward-looking sustainability gap, as in ( )
A negative value of this indicator shows that the current debt-ratio could not be maintained at past values of primary surplus, interest rates and growth rates while a positive value implies an overborrowing ratio that is less than unity.
Benchmark indicators for default
Another approach would be to construct a benchmark of defaulting countries analogous to an IMF study [Callen et al., 2003] . The IMF compared the characteristics of emerging market economies that defaulted since 1998 with the characteristics of non-defaulting countries. In general, defaulting countries had higher debt-to-gdp ratios, a higher share of foreign government debt funding, a higher debt to government receipts ratio and a smaller ratio of the broad money base to gdp than non-defaulting countries.
This benchmark would likely consist of parameters as (debt/GDP, debt/government revenue, foreign debt / total debt, broad money base/GDP, etc.). From these characteristics we might construct a range that could be considered to indicate fiscal unsustainability. Any member state venturing towards this range might be heading for default.
Limitations of this method are that they are dependent on historical data and that no OECD country has defaulted since the Second World War. It might therefore not be appropriate to use these criteria as the current circumstances originate from other factors than the historical circumstances in countries leading to default. A different debt level might therefore be acceptable.
Economic growth and high debts
A third approach would be to examine the effects of a high debt burden on the real economy. Reinhart and Rogoff [2010] show for example that countries with a debt/GDP level higher than 90% have a median GPD growth that is 1% lower. The effect is stronger for countries with a lot of external public debt.
The main characteristic of this threshhold is that it indicates the effects on the economy of a country as a whole. It links debt (potential problem in a part of the economy) to the functioning of the economy as a whole.
Primary surplus to debt feedback
Finally, one may estimate econometrically how the primary surplus ratio responds to the debt ratio. Thus we could estimate ρ in 
2.6
Assessing fiscal sustainability in Europe In this paper we will focus on a)-c) only. In particular, we will consider the following indicators to assess sovereign debt sustainability in selected EMU-countries:
• the sustainability gap indicator (2.10); the sustainability gap indicator shows the distance in terms of primary surplus as a percentage of GDP from a stable debt-ratio. A negative value indicates a shortfall from the primary surplus that would stabilize the debt ratio and a positive value indicates an excess over primary surplus that would stabilize relative debt. This sustainability gap indicator is forward looking as it uses projections of the primary surplus, interest rate and GDP growth. We present the indicators for the average projected development between 2010 and 2019 and the end year 2019.
• the sustainability gap indicator (2.12); the sustainability gap indicator shows the distance in terms of primary surplus as a percentage of GDP from a stable debt-ratio, using realised values for primary surplus, interest and growth rates from the recent past. A negative value indicates overborrowing. This sustainability gap indicator is backward looking as it uses average past values of the primary surplus, interest rate and GDP growth. We calculate these averages for the period 1995-2009.
• the debt-to-government revenue indicator; this is the only indicator (in addition to the debt-to-GDP ratio below) that we consider from the benchmark set approach for emerging market economies; thus, we don't consider foreign currency denominated debts or base money as a percentage of GDP as sustainability indicators in the euro area; Callen et al. (2003) show that the average debt-to-revenue indicator was 350% for defaulting emerging market economies and 250% for non-defaulting countries; for the EMU-countries we consider a ratio below 350% as sustainable.
• the debt-to-GDP ratio; with the threshold value of 90% we associate below-median growth;
hence, it is likely that maintaining debt-ratio's around 90% or higher is more difficult and less sustainable than debt-ratio's at a more modest level
As we will see in chapter 4 these indicators lead to diverging outcomes for the selected euro countries for which we have projected sovereign debts.
In Europe government debt and budget deficits are not only considered as a national issue, but also as a European matter. This chapter discusses the international dimensions of government debt in particular in the EMU countries. Many of the spillover channels between countries are also apparent between countries outside the Eurozone, but they are more intensive in a common currency area. We review the theoretical and empirical arguments pro and contra coordination.
These arguments are splits in two parts: cross-border spillover arguments and other arguments.
Cross-border spillovers
What are the spillovers of national government debt and budget deficits between the Eurozone countries? With that question this paragraph is concerned.
Identifying these spillover channels is also a first step to assess the probability of a debt crisis and to understand the mechanisms of such a crisis. The discussion stems from the massive literature on the formation of optimal currency areas which goes back to Mundell (1961) We concentrate on the possible spillovers from the steep rise in government deficits and debt in some EMU countries on the economic performance and on the sustainability of government debt in other countries. 2 The literature discusses various cross-border spillovers 3 and other arguments for coordinating fiscal policies.
The first externality is higher inflation expectations in the euro zone. The argument is that high debt in one country could only be recovered with inflation such that the central bank is urged to raise the overall inflation rate in the union and affecting price stability in other EMU countries. Fischer et al. (2002) show that larger budget deficits exert an upward pressure on inflation in developing countries in cross sections and panel regressions. However, these effects are insignificant in developed countries. Canzoneri et al. (2001) confirm these results by showing that government debt in Europe and the US is not a significant determinant of the price level.
We conclude that the spillovers of national budget deficits on the inflation rates are negligible because the EMU countries are low inflation countries with a targeted inflation rate of the ECB 1 Recently, Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) provided a survey of the cost and benefits of the EMU based on this literature.
The European Commission (2008) has presented an extensive overview on ten years EMU including the successes and challenges ahead. 2 Note that we ignore private debts here.
of at most 2%. The European Commission (2004) reaches a similar conclusion, but it has to be acknowledged that the recent ECB interventions by buying threatened government bonds suggest that this externality is not just a theoretical possibility.
The second externality is a higher rate of interest on government debt 4 . Every Eurozone country issues its own bonds with a national rate of interest. However, the high interest rate of a particular country could exert an upward pressure on the interest rates in other countries (perceptions of investors). 5 This could even be the case for non-EMU countries, in particular if they have plans to join. This is closely connected to contagion and reputation issues which evidence that the spillover effects of high debts on the interest rate and the country spread are larger than for low debts. Note that the time series are relatively short after the introduction of the euro.
A third externality is that many European financial institutions hold bonds of other EU members. The data of the Bank of International Settlement (BIS) show that these cross-border holdings have increased substantially in the last decades. If there is a chance that the high debt country (partially) defaults, the assets of government bond holders will plummet. In uncertain times this could trigger a chain reaction. Currently banks hold a significant share of Eurozone debt and it is uncertain whether a breach in bank balance sheets caused by a sovereign default will lead to a chain reaction in the form of another banking crisis. Assessing the impact of such an event is crucial in determining whether such a spillover is significant. The formation of the EMU has probably stimulated the cross holdings of government bonds, because the exchange rate risk is reduced, but these relations do also exist between countries with national currencies.
A fourth externality is the stability of the euro vis-à-vis non-euro countries. Exporters benefit from a weaker euro, but imports become more expensive. The net economic effect is not always clear and depends on the economic structure of a country. A deterioration of the euro in response to high debts in one or two member states has certainly an effect on the trading behaviour of euro members with non members. 7 Moreover, financial markets interpret depreciation of currencies often as a sign of weakness of the economic development having adverse effects on stocks markets.
A fifth externality is the transmission via the real economy due to budgetary decisions on the economies in other countries. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) argue that high government debt is often related to poor economic performance, although the causality is not heavily discussed.
Subsequently, poor economic performance affects other EMU economies, in particular via trade, FDI and R&D spillovers. The empirical literature estimates the spillover effects of trade (export and import) with VAR regression techniques. As an example, Giuliodori and Beetsma (2005) estimate that a net tax reduction of 1% of GDP in Germany leads to a maximum 0.7% GDP increase in the Netherlands after seven quarters. After about four years the effect dies out.
That is not only the case for the Netherlands, but also often for other countries. Simulations of CPB (2004) illustrate that a 1% increase in German government spending (measured as share of GDP) raises Dutch GDP about 0.3% in the first two years and that this effect dies out two years later. The size of the spillovers depends on the bilateral trade relations, which are very tight between Germany and the Netherlands but much looser between other EMU countries. We conclude that the long term effects are small although the short term effects are larger.
7 Outside a currency union, one country could simply devaluate its currency in response to difficult economic circumstances.
Beetsma and Guiliodori (2010) describe some examples. These devaluations had serious negative effects on other countries due to less exports and more imports. This externality is eliminated by introducing a common currency. This fourth externality is probably much weaker than the eliminated one.
Other arguments
Here we review other arguments than spillovers on other countries for centralization or
coordination. An argument is economies of scale; issuing government bonds at the EMU level could provide economies of scale compared to issuing government bonds at a national level. In particular, the liquidity of the market could be larger at the EMU level, making it easier to attract money. This argument is often mentioned for issuing Eurobonds with EMU interest rates. In particular smaller EMU member states would benefit from a liquidity premium resulting in a lower rate of interest. 8 A counter argument is the so called common pool problem.
Countries with high debt could benefit from the good reputation of low debt countries at the capital market. They could attract money against lower interest rates. However, the interest rates for low debt countries rise. Moreover, it could be the case that individual member states become more relaxed in applying sound national budget policies. They may not face the consequences and the effect of their policies on the EU fiscal position may be limited. This argument pleas for national bonds or EMU bonds with stringent limits on the fiscal behaviour of member states that could jeopardize the common goals.
Another argument for centralizing fiscal policy is solidarity with other Member States. To some extent the Lisbon treaty already covers this. Bail outs within the EMU are possible in exceptional circumstances related to natural disasters etc. Moreover, the structural and cohesion funds in the EU are partly based on solidarity for helping the poorer member states. There is also self interest here, because all countries benefit from the increase of purchasing power in the poorer member states. Some commentators use the solidarity argument for helping the new member states with the sharp decline of their economies and others use the same argument for Greece.
Conclusions on the reasons for coordination
We conclude that the magnitudes of most spillovers are weak. There are no empirical indications that inflation expectations are affected or economic performance in other countries via trade, FDI etc. in the longer term. There are modest effects on the interest rates from high budget deficits and high government debts but these are not overwhelming. Only in case contagion occurs, the spillovers are large. Contagion can occur in financial spillovers and these financial spillovers are larger if the cross ownership of government bonds holdings is larger.
With a weak and fragile banking system, the contagion mechanism could lead to disruptive effects on the economy in the form of higher interest rates or banks getting into trouble in case of a (partial) government default. This is the main argument for coordinating fiscal policies to some extent and should also be the main target of fiscal policy coordination. The economies of scale of euro bonds by a larger market and solidarity between member states could be additional reasons for intervention, but are not the prime motivation.
Medium term sustainability analysis
We assess the sustainability of government debt in the EMU countries using the Fiscal Sustainability Simulation model ("FSS") as an analytical tool. The model is described in some detail in section 4.1. The baseline projections underlying the FSS are OECD projections and are described in section 4.2. Some variants of the projections also impose the fiscal burden of ageing on the government budget. The outcomes of the FSS using these baseline projections are presented in section 4.3. In section 4.4 we comment on debt sustainability and the appropriateness of fiscal consolidation measures.
The model
The FSS generates a stochastic forecast for the development of government debt over GDP. Our approach closely follows van Wijnbergen's approach for the assessment of sovereign debt sustainability. Van Wijnbergen and Budina (2008) repetitively apply the following central flow budget equation for the development of government debt as a percentage of GDP: Within the Eurozone most government debt is euro-denominated and we assume that the exchange rate risk of the non euro-denominated part of government debt is hedged. Therefore we drop the foreign currency part. Furthermore we consider monetary policy to be an externality within the Eurozone (set by the ECB) and take seigniorage revenue as part of the primary surplus. Unlike van Wijnbergen we do not calculate the seigniorage revenue maximizing inflation rate, as this would be against the ECB policy goal to limit the annual inflation rate to 2%. This simplifies our central equation to:
To obtain a debt path we need a forecast for the development of the primary surplus, the longterm interest and GDP growth rate. Note that we can take either both r and γ real or nominal for small levels of inflation. To obtain a stochastic debt forecast we must make either some or all of the forecast variables stochastic.
We obtain a quarterly projection for the primary surplus, long-term interest rate and nominal GDP growth rate from the OECD Economic Outlook no.87, preliminary edition (OECD, 2010).
We use OECD projections as a baseline because they are available for all Eurozone member states and follow the same methodology for all countries.
Stochastic features are added to these projections in the following way. For the primary surplus we calculate the variance of the primary surplus at the country level from historical data from The stochastic parts are generated by multiplying the variance for the primary surplus and the (Cholesky decomposed) covariance matrix for GDP growth and long-term interest rates by a set of IID(0,1) drawings. These results are added to the projections of primary surplus, GDP growth and long-term interest rates and used to calculate the debt in the next period.
A debt path in our model is 40 periods, or 10 years, long (from 2010Q1-2019Q4). In our model we repeat this calculation 5000 times, such that we obtain 5000 debt paths. 9 The expected debt path and its expected standard deviation are then calculated and plotted. The results can be used to assess sustainability.
OECD baseline forecasts
As stated before we use the OECD Economic Outlook no.87, preliminary edition (OECD, 2010) to obtain our baseline. We discuss the main features of these projections in this section.
GDP growth
Real GDP growth rates and expected inflation rates are given in the table below. The OECD projections assume that the output gap is closed over the period 2012-2015, which explains the relative high real GDP growth in this time period. The growth rates after 2015 are the expected long term growth rates. Inflation is assumed to be lower than the ECB target of 2% until 2015 due to the current economic crisis. Except for Ireland this will however not lead to deflation.
After 2015 inflation is expected to be at the ECB target.
Primary surplus
Primary surplus for 2010 and 2011 is determined by subtracting the implied interest expenses from the financial government balance. After 2011 the primary surplus is expected to improve automatically because of the closure of the output gap. The OECD assumes the output gap is closed in 4 years (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) . Even with a closed output gap, the OECD concludes some countries to be on an unsustainable debt path and projects additional fiscal consolidation. The OECD assumes such countries will realize ½% of GDP improvement of their primary balance per year of consolidation starting in 2012.
Government debt
In our analysis we examine the sustainability of the EMU Debt as defined by Eurostat, because it is the most widely used definition and it is a definition that is consistently applied among member states.
Maturity structure of government debt
In the medium term governments have some liberty to adjust the maturity structure of their debt such that it fits their desired maturity structure. With a normal yield curve the interest rate required by the market is lower for shorter maturities and the interest rate volatility risk and liquidity risk are lower for longer maturities. We use the simplifying assumption that in the average maturity time the entire debt will be rolled over with equal parts being due in every period. This may imply that interest rate volatility is extended over a longer time period than actually is the case. Furthermore we also assume that all debt is financed against this average maturity and that the interest rate due is the long-term interest rate. We have obtained the average maturities of outstanding government debt from the websites of the debt management offices. For the countries under consideration the average maturity of the government debt ranges between 6 and 8 years.
Long-term interest rates
The OECD expects the long term interest rates to rise from the historic low rates of the 2000s to their historical average of 5.4% for the Eurozone. Intercountry differences are explained by an interest rate premium of 4 basis points for every 1% debt/GDP above 75%. This is consistent with OECD estimates (Egert, 2010).
Externalities
We assume a budget neutral effect of the current and possible future bailouts of the banking sector. This means we neglect externalities of this type. The ageing of the European population will add considerable cost to Eurozone primary surpluses. The ideal approach assesses the extra implications for primary surpluses and is given in appendix A. To be consistent with the other projections we use the OECD projections for these costs (OECD, 2010) however. The increase in costs due to ageing assumes unchanged policy and structural trends. In the ageing scenario below we assume the costs of ageing are included in the primary surplus projections up to 2011 and assume that from 2012 onward additional costs apply.
We realize that these aging costs reach only to the end of the projection period and do not take further future costs into account. They will be useful however in showing that even these modest amounts of additional costs can make government debts unsustainable. 
OECD projections / long-term interest rates
Government debt forecasts Forecasts with OECD baselines
We have run the stochastic simulation model four times:
• OECD baseline forecasts without additional consolidation and without ageing costs:
this simulation uses the GDP growth, long-term interest rate and primary surplus OECD projection as described in section 4.2, without the additional ageing costs and without the additional years of fiscal consolidation
• OECD baseline forecasts with additional consolidation and without ageing costs:
here the same projections as in the previous simulation are used, with a difference to the primary surplus projections which are adjusted for additional fiscal consolidation. For every year of fiscal consolidation, starting in 2012, it is assumed that the primary surplus improves by ½%. It is important to note here that according to the OECD for some countries additional fiscal consolidation continues to take place after the end of our forecast period.
• OECD baseline forecasts without additional consolidation and with ageing costs:
here we use again the baseline projections as described in the first simulation and simply add the aging costs as an externality.
• OECD baseline forecasts with additional consolidation and with ageing costs:
this simulation combines the two previous additions to the first simulation.
In the 4 figures below we plot the results of these four scenarios. We present the results for nine EMU countries: Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. We have neglected some small countries and new EMU members. 10 The model runs 10 The results for Austria, Finland and Luxembourg are available upon request. The outcomes are not presented due to space limitations. In all scenarios these countries do not seem to have any sustainability problem. The results have been summarized in the table below.
OECD projections
Simulation outcomes
A first conclusion from the projections is that government debt will continue to rise almost everywhere in the medium term. Without consolidation the GDP weighted average government debt rises by 28.1% points. Additional budget consolidation reduces the debt/GDP ratio by 12.1% points on average. The burden of ageing on the government budget worsens the budgetary positions of all EMU countries. The average effect of ageing is an increase of 5.0%
of debt/GDP ratio. This demonstrates that a significant rise in primary surplus is required in most member states in order to offset the additional ageing costs, even when these only pertain to the projection period. Including the costs of ageing and debt consolidation, sovereign debt only stabilizes in Belgium. We therefore conclude in line with other studies that structural reforms will be necessary to address the ageing issue in the projection period and further beyond.
Next, we recognize that there are not only significant differences in inter-country starting positions, but also in inter-country development paths. These paths strongly depend on the initial starting position, the projections for GDP growth, long-term interest rates, primary surpluses and the feasibility of fiscal consolidation and of incurring the costs of ageing.
Furthermore historic volatility in interest and GDP growth rates as well as primary surplus causes the standard deviation in mean debt paths to be different.
Here we describe the outcomes per country:
Italy: Government debt is more or less stabilized after an increase of 9.2% points, however the ageing issue needs to be addressed in order to obtain a stable debt / GDP ratio. Furthermore the level at which government debt is stabilized is relatively high. points to relatively high levels.
Belgium:
In Belgium government debt ratios decline after a small hump due to a sturdy primary surplus and closure of the output gap. Even without fiscal consolidation and tackling of additional ageing costs debt ratios do not become unstable.
Greece:
In Greece government debt ratios stabilize after a significant increase in 2010 and 2011 due to a closure of the output gap. However, if the ageing issue is not dealt with, debt levels will rise again and become unstable. Again debt levels remain high here throughout the projection period.
Germany, Netherlands:
With consolidation debt also stabilizes in Germany and the Netherlands after an increase of 8.8% points (Germany) or 16.6% points (Netherlands). This is no longer true however if the costs of ageing are also taken into account.
Stress tests
Two stress-test scenarios are developed on top of the baseline consolidation scenario. In stresstest scenario 1 (S1) the Eurozone is not able to win back the financial markets trust and Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Spain and Greece have to pay 250 basis points additional interest spread on their debt in 2011 and 2012. This leads to a higher interest payment in 2011 until 2018 due to the assumed maturity structure of debt. The precise end date is country dependent.
In stress-test scenario 2 we assume the current economic recession turns into a Japan style lost decade. Here the output gap persists; resulting in lower real GDP growth in the period 2012-permanent lower tax revenue and higher social security expenditures). The outcomes of the stress-tests are displayed in the table in the next section.
Conclusions on fiscal sustainability
In this section we apply the sustainability indicators described in section 2.6 on the simulations performed in section 4.3 and conclude on the outcomes. First, we state how we apply the indicators on the simulation outcomes; subsequently we show and discuss the indicator outcomes. After that we elaborate on a way to reconcile the different test outcomes with each other and conclude on sustainability after reconciliation.
Definition of the indicators
We have one simulation independent indicator, which is the current over-borrowing ratio expressed as a sustainability gap. This can be seen as an indicator for the current state of government finances as it confronts realised values in the recent past of primary surplus, interest and growth rates with debt-over-GDP.
We present three sustainability indicators: the forward looking sustainability gap, the debt/government revenue ratio and the debt/GDP ratio. We calculate the sustainability gap using equation 2.10 and use for the debt/government revenue and debt/GDP sustainability indicator a simple Yes/No sustainability indicator.
As sustainability gap indicator we display the average sustainability gap in our simulation period (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) (2018) (2019) and the end-of-period sustainability gap (2019Q4), which functions as a proxy for the sustainability of government debt after our forecast period. The debt/government revenue indicator is positive if this ratio is smaller than 350% in 2019. The 350% benchmark is the average debt/government revenue ratio of defaulting developing countries according to the IMF (Callen et al, 2003) . As a proxy for 2019 government revenue we use 2009 government revenue, which is displayed in the table on government primary surplus and debt in section 4.2.
The debt/GDP indicator is positive if debt/GDP is smaller than 90% in 2019, because above 90% their might be a negative impact on economic growth (Reinhart & Rogoff 2010) .
Indicator results
We have applied the 4 criteria described in section 2.6 on the baseline forecasts and the stress tests and display the results in the table below:
Here "SG av" denotes the average sustainability gap in the simulation period 2010-2019, "SG 19" denotes the sustainability gap at the end of the period, "/GDP" the outcome of the debt/GDP test and "/Rev" the outcome of the debt/government revenue test.
These test outcomes clarify the conclusions based on visual inspection of the FSS debt path graphs in section 4.3. The average sustainability gap being negative in almost all scenarios for all countries implies that average debt levels must be rising in the projection period.
Furthermore a negative sustainability gap in 2019 implies government debt to be unsustainable if unattended. We will now reconcile the test outcomes in order to conclude.
Assessing simulation outcomes
We draw conclusions from these outcomes, using a constructed relative rating of the importance of the outcomes. We realize that these assessments are debatable, determining them as follows.
• No issues: Declining government debt and no sustainability issues in the projection period. This means: 2019 sustainability gap is positive (long-run declining debt) and either the average sustainability gap is positive (on average a declining debt throughout the projection period) or the average sustainability gap is negative and the debt/GDP and debt/government revenue tests are passed (meaning that although there is a temporary increase in debt in the projection period, debt stays within reasonable bounds and debt levels will be decreasing after 2019).
• Relatively stable: Stable government debt and no sustainability issues in the projection period or declining debt and sustainability issues in the projection period. This means either the 2019 sustainability gap is not smaller than -1% of GDP and debt/GDP and debt/government revenue tests are passed (small sustainability gap at most, which could be bridged by two years of fiscal 
ageing & consolidation S1: extra interest S2: output gap consolidation, while debt levels are reasonable) or 2019 sustainability gap is positive, but the average sustainability gap is negative and debt/GDP or debt/government revenue tests are failed (implying a sustainable long term outlook, but possible issues in the medium term).
• Action required: Significantly rising government debt levels combined with some ability to repay. The 2019 sustainability gap is not smaller than -3% of GDP (6 years of fiscal consolidation) and either the debt/GDP or debt/government revenue test is passed such that there is some capacity to repay in the long run. In this case action is required by policy makers as government debt won't stabilize. Furthermore, depending on the average sustainability gap, there might be debt issues in the medium term, because financial markets might loose confidence in the light of continuing fiscal deficits without a positive long-term outlook.
• Potentially dangerous: All tests failed. Without further action government debt is likely to spiral out of control as both the medium term and long term outlook are negative.
Outcomes and conclusion
The test outcomes are displayed in the table below:
• Baseline: Belgium shows a solid debt development. Action is required in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. Other countries need significant additional fiscal consolidation or structural reforms to prevent their debt from spiralling out of control.
• Ageing: Without additional consolidation or measures to address the ageing problem only the Belgium government debt is manageable, in Italy additional fiscal consolidation is required and all other countries need to take extra measures over and above the projected additional fiscal consolidation.
• Consolidation: With fiscal consolidation Belgium has no debt issues, Germany, the • Ageing and consolidation: When the costs of ageing are added to the fiscal consolidation scenario, debt developments worsen for all countries. Belgian debt is still relatively stable.
Additional action is needed in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy and Portugal. In
Greece and Ireland larger efforts are needed to maintain debt sustainability.
• S1: When applying a 250 basis points interest shock to Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain and
Portugal (compared to the consolidation scenario), Greece's debt sustainability becomes potentially dangerous, the Irish debt stays that way, Portugal and Italy migrate to the 'Action required' category and Spain remains there. The fact that Greece and Italy are more hit by an interest rate shock than Portugal and Spain is caused by their higher initial debt and thus higher interest rate commitments.
• S2: In the most severe stress-test S2, which is essentially a lasting depression, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, France and Portugal need to undertake action like additional fiscal consolidation, whereas the other member states need to make structural adjustments and fiscal consolidation.
Concluding on a country basis for the 'consolidation' scenario, which implies additional fiscal consolidation for most member states, it turns out that extra measures over and above the OECD consolidation scenario are required in Greece and Spain. Ireland has to tackle its debt issues even further and may not be able to avoid painful policy measures.
Finally the reader needs to note that not the full cost of ageing is taken into account, hence implying the possible need for additional reforms and that member states have all announced or are currently working on fiscal consolidation plans, which will in some cases be stricter than the fiscal consolidation assumed by the OECD. However these plans are not yet implemented.
Implementation depends on the state of the Eurozone economy, the political situation in a country and the effectiveness of the Eurozone fiscal framework that is currently being developed. Our assessments indicate mixed results under miscellaneous assumptions. Thus, recurrent sovereign debt crises within EMU are not at all inconceivable the coming decade.
This calls for a quick realignment of policy rules and institutions that would enable to prevent crisis development and would install an authority with the capacity to manage crisis situations (if they nevertheless occur) efficiently and proficiently. In order to prevent contagion this authority should oversee fiscal consolidation programs of member states that are in trouble, organise a bail-out when necessary and organise a structured default when inevitable. If anything, the results of our sustainability assessments point to an undiminished necessity to quickly make progress in all three of these fields. After all, our analysis shows that the possibility of sovereign debt crises in Europe is not at all behind us yet. Even if the growth of government debt in Europe due to the current economic crisis can be reversed, new fiscal challenges are ahead, in particular covering the public cost of ageing beyond the projection period.
